Maneuver Warfare and Office Politics: Applying the Indirect Approach for Tactical Advantage

Being an ex-military officer, I have a big fan of the indirect approach as advocated by the British military strategist B.H. Liddell Hart. As a concept of warfare, the indirect approach emphasizes movement over brute force to defeat the enemy. At its essence, manoeuver warfare forces the capitulation of the enemy through the elimination of their ability to respond.

Liddell Hart taught that there are three types of dislocations to create tactical advantage — positional, temporal, and functional. Positional dislocation occurs when the enemy’s forces are not in a position where they can effectively influence the battle; temporal dislocation involves creating a situation in which the enemy’s forces are unavailable and hence unable influence the battle; and functional dislocation involves rendering the enemy’s forces ineffective by exploiting weaknesses in their composition or equipment. By understanding and utilizing these three types of dislocations, a military strategist can gain a significant tactical advantage over their adversary.

I believe that Liddell Hart’s concept of the indirect approach can also be used to navigate office politics:

Positional dislocation involves gaining a positional advantage within an organization so that an office adversary is unable to act against you. These can be achieved by building relationships with key decision-makers who then act as natural barriers, securing roles that control information or resources that the office adversary requires, or establishing yourself in a relative position of authority over the office adversary.

Temporal dislocation is about timing your actions so that the office adversary is unavailable to respond. Examples of these would be acting when the office adversary is engaged with another project, or when the office adversary is distracted and hence will be slow to recognise your actions giving you time to secure a foothold.

Functional dislocation is about rendering the power of the office adversary ineffective by disrupting the existing power structures or alliances by changing the underlying dynamics of the situation. Examples of these would be removing the authority of the office adversary over key resources or undermining the value of the office adversary’s contributions and hence their influence.

Thus, while these three types of dislocations were originally developed for military strategy, they can also be easily applied in various contexts, including dealing with office politics. By strategically positioning oneself, timing the moments, and disrupting existing power structures, it is possible to successfully navigate office politics.